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Abstract. We analyse the darkweb and find its structure is unusual.
For example, ∼ 87% of darkweb sites never link to another site. To call
the darkweb a “web” is thus a misnomer – it’s better described as a set
of largely isolated dark silos. As we show through a detailed comparison
to the World Wide Web (www), this siloed structure is highly dissimilar
to other social networks and indicates the social behavior of darkweb
users is much different to that of www users. We show a generalized
preferential attachment model can partially explain the strange topology
of the darkweb, but an understanding of the anomalous behavior of its
users remains out of reach. Our results are relevant to network scientists,
social scientists, and other researchers interested in the social interactions
of large numbers of agents.
Keywords: social networks, graph theory, computational network sci-
ence
1 Introduction
Studies of the World Wide Web (www) have had much impact. An understanding
of its topology have let us better understand how its information is stored and
can be retrieved [11,6]. Insight into its paradoxical resilience [13] have allowed
us to design more fault tolerant networks [12], and the universal dynamics of it
growth patterns [3] have shed light on the behaviors of many others classes of
networks [4]. And perhaps most importantly, being one of the earliest studied
networks4 [11,6], the www helped give rise to the flame of attention that network
science enjoys today.
This paper is about the www’s shady twin: the darkweb. Though the darkweb
is similar to the www, both being navigated through a web browser, a key
difference the two is that the identities of darkweb users are hidden – that’s
what makes it ‘dark’. This gives the darkweb an infamous air of mystery, which,
along with the sparse academic attention it has received [17,18], makes it ripe
for analysis. And beyond satisfying curiosity, its reasonable to think studies of
the darkweb could have as much applied impact as the studies of the www.
4 alongside smallworld networks [5].
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There are many natural questions to ask about the darkweb. Does it have the
same topology as the www, and therefore hold and distribute information in the
same way? Is it resilient to attack? Social questions can also be posed. Results
from psychology and game theory show people behave more socially when they
are watched [7,8] or have reputations to uphold [29]. Do darkweb users, whose
identities masked, therefore behave more selfishly than www users, whose faces
are bare? Finally, beyond the academic impact that answering these questions
might generate, insight about the structure or dynamics of the darkweb could
have societal benefit, potentially allowing policy-makers to better police its more
sinister aspects.
Here we address some of these questions by performing a graph theoretical
analysis of the darkweb (we define exactly what we mean by the darkweb below)
and comparing it to the www. We find the topologies of the darkweb and the
www are starkly different – in fact, the darkweb is much different to many social
networks – and conjecture this is due to their users’ differing social behaviour.
We hope our work stimulates further research on the darkweb’s structure as well
as the social dynamics of its users.
2 Data Collection
There is no single definition of the darkweb. It is sometimes loosely defined as
“anything seedy on the Internet”, but in this work we define the darkweb as all
domains underneath the “.onion” psuedo-top-level-domain[16] (which is some-
times called the onionweb). Specifically, we mean the subset of the web where
websites are identified not by a human-readable hostname (e.g., yahoo.com) or
by a IP number (e.g., 206.190.36.45), but by a randomly generated 16-character
address (specifically, a hash fingerprint). Each website can be accessed via its
hash, but it is very difficult to learn the IP number of a website from its hash
– this is what makes the web ‘dark’; without an IP number, it is exceedingly
difficult to trace the geographical origin of a communication.
Crawling the darkweb is not much harder than crawling the regular web. In
our case, we crawled the darkweb through the popular tor2web proxy onion.link.
Onion.link does all of the interfacing with Tor, and one can crawl all dark-
web pages without a login simply by setting a standard crawler to specifically
crawl the domain *.onion.link. Darkweb pages are written in the same HTML
language as the regular web which means we could crawl onion.link using the
commercial service scrapinghub.com. Starting from two popular lists of darkweb
sites,5 we accessed each page and crawled all linked pages using breadth-first
search.
Most analyses of the www are at the page-level, where each node is an indi-
vidual URL. One could adopt this model for the darkweb; it would be a natural
choice for engineering motivated research question, such as studying crawlability.
But the page-level model is not natural for socially motivated research question,
5 http://directoryvi6plzm.onion and https://ahmia.fi/onions/
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which we are interested in in this study, because the page-level graph is influ-
enced more by the various choices of content management system, rather than by
social dynamics. So we instead follow the modeling choice in [20] and aggregate
by second-level domain (for the onionweb the second-level domain is equivalent
to [20]’s “pay-level domain”). This means that links within a second-level do-
main are ignored as socially irrelevant self-connections. In this formulation, each
vertex in the darkweb is a domain and every directed edge from u → v means
there exists a page within domain u linking to a page within domain v. The
weight of the edge from u → v is the number of pages on domain u linking to
pages on domain v.
The Tor Project Inc. (the creators and custodians of the darkweb) state there
are ∼60, 000 distinct, active .onion addresses [21]. In our analysis, however, we
found merely 7, 178 active .onion domains. We attribute this high-discrepancy to
various messaging services—particularly TorChat [22], Tor Messenger [23], and
Ricochet [24]. In all of these services, each user is identified by a unique .onion
domain.
The darkweb has a notoriously high attrition rate; its sites regularly ap-
pear and disappear. This complicates our analysis because it creates dead links,
links to pages which have been removed. We do not want the dead links in our
datasets so we collected responsive sites only; if we discover a link to a page
on domain v, but domain v could not be reached after > 10 attempts across
November 2016–February 2017, we delete node v and all edges to node v. Before
pruning nonresponding domains, our constructed graph had 13,117 nodes and
39,283 edges. After pruning, it has 7, 178 nodes and 25, 104 edges (55% and 64%
respectively). The pruned graph is the one used in the rest of this paper, which
from now on we call “ the darkweb graph”.
We note that the darkweb as defined above is different from the network
described in [18]. There, the network represents volunteer-operated nodes that
could be connected in the sense that they could appear as consecutive nodes in
a path through the Tor network. This is completely different from our network.
3 Graph-theoretic Results
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the darkweb and www. In what follows,
we discuss these and other statistics.
3.1 Degree distribution
We begin with statistics on degree distributions, reported in Figure 1. Panels
(a) and (b) show the in and out degree distributions of the darkweb resemble
power laws6, just like the www, but with one crucial difference: the location of
6 Unfortunately however, we were able to confirm the power laws quantitatively.
Following [25], which describes how to fit to power laws rigorously, we tried to fit
the degree distribution data using the python package plfit, but the fitting failed
on account of there not being enough data (the range of the data didn’t cover enough
orders of magnitude.)
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Measure www [20] darkweb
Num nodes 43M 7, 178
Num edges 623M 25, 104
Prop. connected pairs ∼42% 8.11%
Average SPL 4.27 4.35
Edges per node 14.5 3.50
Network diameter* 48 5
Harmonic diameter ∼9.55 232.49
Table 1: Summarized network level properties between the www and the dark-
web. Asterisk for the entries requiring conversion to an undirected graph.
the y-intercept. In (a) we see ∼30% of domains have exactly one incoming link
(kin = 1), with 62% come from one of the five largest out-degree hubs. In (b),
we see a whopping 87% of sites do not link to any other site (kout = 0)! – these
are the dark silos that we mentioned in the abstract.
These findings tell us the darkweb is a sparse hub-and-spoke place. The bulk
of its sites live in seclusion, not wanting to connect with the outside world.
Panel (c) confirms this picture by showing the vast majority of pages have low
pagerank (and so are isolated). Panel (d) shows that when a site does link to
another, 32% of the time it’s only a single page linking out.
As we show in the next section, this siloed structure is not shared by many
social networks.
3.2 Bow-tie decomposition
A useful way to describe directed graphs is via bow-tie decomposition, where the
nodes are divided into six disjoint parts [28]:
1. CORE — Also called the “Largest Strongly Connected Component”. It is
defined as the largest subset of nodes such that there exists a directed path
(in both directions, from u→ · · · → v as well as v → · · · → u) between every
pair of nodes in the set.
2. IN — The set of nodes, excluding those in the CORE, that are ancestors of
a CORE node.
3. OUT — The set of nodes, excluding those in the CORE, that are descen-
dants of a CORE node.
4. TUBES — The set of nodes, excluding those in the CORE, IN, and OUT,
who have an ancestor in IN as well as a descendant in OUT.
5. TENDRILS — Nodes that have an ancestor in IN but do not have a de-
scendant in OUT. Also, nodes that have a descendant in OUT but do not
have an ancestor in IN.
6. DISCONNECTED — Everything else.
Figure 2 compares the bowtie decompositions of the darkweb and www. The
www numbers are taken from [19,20,15]. We chose these works because of the
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Fig. 1: The distribution of the in-degree, out-degree, pagerank, and edgeweights.
In (c) we exclude the three domains with the highest pagerank because they are
such extreme outliers. For all plots with a log-scale axis, we follow following
[20,15] to use the Fibonacci binning from [27].
size of their crawls and the rigor of their analyses. Notice the www has each of
one the 6 components of the bow-tie decomposition, whereas the darkweb only
has a CORE and an OUT component. Moreover, the OUT component of the
darkweb contains ∼ 96% (these are the dark silos), leaving the CORE with just
∼ 4% of the mass. This is unusual for a social network; most have large COREs.
The www’s CORE has > 50% of the mass, while the cores of Orkut, YouTube,
Flickr [30] and Twitter [31] are even larger. In this sense, the darkweb is a social
network anomaly.
3.3 Diameter analysis
Next we examine the darkweb’s internal connectivity by computing the shortest-
path-length (SPL) between nodes. Figure 3(a) and (b) shows the SPL’s for the
www and darkweb. For all pairs of nodes {u, v} in the darkweb, only 8.11%
are connected by a directed path from u → · · · → v or v → · · · → u. This is
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IN 3.3M 7.65% 0 0.0%
OUT 13.3M 30.98% 6881 95.86%
TUBES 17k .04% 0 0.0%
TENDRILS 514k 1.2% 0 0.0%
DISCONNECTED 3.5M 8.2% 0 0.0%
Fig. 2: Bow-tie decompositions of the www and darkweb. The figures for the
www were taken from [20].
drastically lower than the ∼43.42% found in the www [20]. We again attribute
this to the low out-degree per 1. Of the connected pairs, the darkweb’s average
shortest path length is 4.35 compared to the 4.27 in the world-wide-web [20].
It’s surprising to see a graph as small as the darkweb have a higher mean SPL
than the entire world-wide-web, and is a testament to how sparse the darkweb
graph really is. Figure 3(c) plots the distribution of SPLs for the 297 nodes of
the CORE. To our surprise, the mean SPL within the CORE is 3.97, only 9%
less than the entire darkweb. From this we conclude the CORE is not densely
interconnected.
3.4 Robustness and Fragility
Does the peculiar structure of the darkweb make it resilient to attack? Figure 4
shows it does not; as seen, the entire network (WCC) as well as the CORE
quickly disintegrates under node removal. In Figures 4(a) and (b) we see the
familiar resistance to random failure yoked with fragility to targeted attacks, in
keeping with the findings of [32]. Figures 4(b) shows that, unlike the www [20],
the WCC is more susceptible to high in-degree deletions than the CORE. This
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Fig. 3: Comparing shortest path lengths between the world-wide-web and the
darkweb considering directed edges. Whereas in the www 56.65% of node pairs
have have ∞ path-length (no path connecting them), in the darkweb 91.89% of
node-pairs have no path connecting them. Moreover, even within that 8.11% of
pairs with a directed path between them, the darkweb’s average SPL (µ = 4.35)
is higher than that of the www (µ = 4.27).
elaborates the view from Figures 4(c) that the CORE is – in addition to not
being strongly interconnected – is also not any kind of high in-degree nexus.
Figures 4(c) and (d) show the breakdown when removing central nodes. In
(c), the CORE is largely unaffected by low centrality deletions. In Figure 4(c)
we see that although the CORE isn’t disproportionately held together by high
in-degree nodes, it is dominated by very central nodes.
Comparing Figures 4(b) and (f) we see the CORE relative to the entire net-
work consists of more high-pagerank nodes than high in-degree nodes. This im-
plies CORE nodes are not created by their high-indegree (4b), but by their high
centrality, amply corroborated by Figures 4(c) and (d). Likewise, Figures 4(e)
recapitulates 4a, that nodes with especially low in-degree or centrality are, un-
surprisingly, not in the CORE.
3.5 Reciprocal Connections
The authors of [19] stress the importance of reciprocal connections in maintain-
ing the www’s graph properties. We compute two of their measures. First, we
compute [19]’s measure 〈kinkout〉〈kin〉〈kout〉 =
E[kinkout]
E[kin]E[kout] , to quantify in-degree and out-
degree’s deviation from independence. For the darkweb, we arrive at 〈kinkout〉〈kin〉〈kout〉 =
3.70. This is in the middle of the road of prior estimates of the www, and means
that the out-degree and in-degree are positively correlated. For greater clarity,
we also plot the average out-degree as a function of the in-degree, given as,
〈kout(kin)〉 = 1
Nkin
∑
i∈Υ (kin)
kout,i , (1)
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Fig. 4: Deleting nodes from the darkweb graph and seeing how quickly the
WCC and CORE disintegrate. In all plots, we shuffled the order of nodes with
the same value until reaching stable statistics, e.g., in 1c, 98% of nodes are
tied for the lowest pagerank; so when removing only 10% of the nodes (e.g.,
4e), it’s ambiguous which nodes should be deleted first. So in our analysis we
shuffled the ordering of the nodes with the same value and recomputed sizes of
the WCC/CORE until the median was stable.
which is simply “For all nodes of a given in-degree, what is the mean out-
degree?”. The results are depicted in Figure 5. In short, in the darkweb there’s
no obvious pattern to the relationship between in-degree and out-degree.
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Fig. 5: (a): Scatter plot of kin and kout. (b) Plot of averaged kout versus kin. (c)
Comparing the rates of the darkweb sites linking to the www versus linking to
other darkweb sites. They are essentially the same.
3.6 Network growth model
Are standard network growth models able to capture the topology of the dark-
web? Here we show a generalized preferential attachment model approximately
can. In regular preferential attachment, nodes of only one type are added sequen-
tially to a network. Here, we generalize this procedure to two types of nodes:
pages and portals. Page nodes model the nodes in the darkweb which do not
link to anyone (and so have kin = 0). Portals model the rest of the nodes, which
act as ‘portals’ to the page nodes. The dynamics of the ‘page-portal’ model are
defined as follows.
At t = 0 N0 portals are arranged in a given network. At each time step after
t > 0, a new page is added to the network and m different portals are chosen
to link to m end nodes (these end nodes can be either pages or portals). The
portal which does the linking is chosen according to preferential attachment,
that is, chosen with probability ∝ (1 + kβout), where kout is the out degree and
β is a free parameter. The end node chosen with probability ∝ (1 + kβin). Notice
this scheme means that only portals can link, which means page nodes forever
remain with kin = 0, as desired. The model has three free parameters m,β,N0.
We chose N0 = 397 so as to match the number of portals in our datasets (defined
as all nodes with kin > 0) and ran the model for 6242 timesteps i.e added 6242
page nodes) so that there were 7178 nodes at the end of the process which again
matched the dataset.
Figure 6 shows the page-portal model with parameters (m,β) = (4, 2) ap-
proximates the darkweb, the in and out degree distributions of the model ap-
proximately mimicking the data. We report exponents of best fit, found using
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the powerlaw package python. But keep in mind that as mentioned earlier, there
are not enough orders of magnitude in the data for the estimates of the ex-
ponents to be reliable; thus the page and portal model is intended as a first
step in modeling the darkweb. The values were (αin, αout)data = (3.09, 2.10) and
(αin, αout)model = (4.3± 1.3, 2.4± 0.2), where the model figures report means of
10 realizations and the error is given as half the range. The fitting was performed
using the python powerlaw package. αin was much more difficult to measure than
αout. As much as half of realizations led to estimates αin > 50, which we interpret
as the failure of the fitting to converge, and so were discarded.
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Fig. 6: Comparison of in (kin) and out (kout) degree statistics of darkweb and
page-portal model. (a) Probability density functions of kin and kout for page and
portal model. (c)-(d) Histograms of above quantities.
4 Conclusion
Our primary finding is that the darkweb is a social network anomaly. Its light
CORE and massive OUT components distinguishes it from other popular social
networks. In fact, calling it a ‘web’ is a connectivity misnomer; it is more accurate
to view it as a set of dark silos – a place of isolation, entirely distinct from the
well connected world of the www and other social network. What causes the
darkweb to be so isolated? We see two possible explanations:
– The technological explanation. In the darkweb, sites go up and go down
all the time. Why bother linking if there’s little chance that the destination
will still exist?
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– The social explanation. People who create sites on the darkweb are cut
from a different social cloth than those who create sites on the www (or at
least when using the darkweb, these people behave differently)
To test the technological explanation, we performed a second crawl collecting
instances of darkweb sites linking to the www and compared the relative rates of
outbound linking in Figure 5(c). There are essentially equal rates of outbound
linking to the www as well as the darkweb which tells us (i) the low outbound
linking is not due to the impermanence of onion sites and (ii) if onion sites
got drastically more stable, we would still see very low rates of linking. Taken
together, these indicate the technological explanation is likely untrue. Thus, the
social explanation is likely cause of the darkweb’s anomalous structure.
Rigorously testing the social hypothesis is however beyond the scope of this
work. Although, in a sense we have taken a first step in this direction by gen-
eralizing preferential attachment which itself can be viewed as model of social
behavior; it is a model of trust: highly linked nodes are perceived as ‘trustworthy’
sources of information, and so receive a disproportionate number of links; the
rich get richer. The isolated silos of the darkweb, however, indicate trust does
not play a role in the dynamics governing its evolution. Rather, one might say
it indicates that distrust does. The passive pages of the page and portal model
(which recall, do not link to anybody through the dynamics, and are in that
sense passive) were a crude way to incorporate this effect. But a more principled
behavioral model (i.e. which consistent with known results from psychology)
is needed, which were were unable to develop. We hope psychology-fluent re-
searchers will take up this task in future work.
Future work could also study the temporal aspects of the darkweb. Is the
topology we have found stationary? For example, in the work most closely related
to ours [18], it was found that the resilience of the studied ‘darknet’ evolved over
time (as discussed in the Data Collection section, our darkweb graph is much
different to the darknet in [18]). It would be interesting to see if the resilience of
our darkweb graph behaves like this too.
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